As agents of fascism within the labour movement, the Kautskyites immerse themselves amongst proletarian activists. On the one hand, this allows the Kautskyites to infiltrate the labour movement, betraying it in favour of the anti-proletarian suppressors. On the other hand, such Kautskyite immersion amongst proletarians permits the proletarian agents to encircle and thus coopt the Kautskyite intelligence officers, forcing the latter into action against the Kautskyites’ own fascist spymasters. Such was the story of the Kerensky gang, which (1) on the one hand, plotted to assist the Tsarist White Guards led by Kornilov to overthrow the Russian democracy and establish an anti-Soviet anti-Bolshevik fascist military dictatorship, and (2) on the other hand, thanks to proletarian pressures in Kerensky’s social democratic party, famously ended up militarily funding the Bolshevik-dominated Red Guards, allowing them to not only overthrow the Kornilov coup plotters but also the Kerensky Administration itself.
The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies
Chapter 2, Section 2 (C2S1)
Saed Teymuri
Large segments of the Tsarist army were compositionally proletarianized. Feeling threatened by the rise of communist sympathies amongst the workers, the anti-proletarian classes dominating pre-socialist Russia had deliberately demoted the communistic-minded workers to the level of being soldiers and sent them to war as cannon-fodder – on the one hand, the rivals of Tsarist colonialism would be killed, and on the other hand the proletarians of the Russian Empire would be expended and killed. While such was the agenda of the regime, and while it did work to a large extent, the defeats of the Russian military weakened the reactionary enemies enough to give room for communist organization of these soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds. Indeed,:
[one] factor that worked in the Party’s favor was the fact that the Monarchy had made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also contributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the proletariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted workers: they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic decline. The «hereditary proletariat» that was drafted naturally sympathised strongly with the development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
In addition,:
Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army consisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily persuaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the «imperialist war,» particularly since they were suffering continual defeats. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Owing to their petit-bourgeois class mentality, the peasant-background soldiers were less against the fascist war than the proletarian-background soldiers, and they began to doubt the very ‘philosophy’ of the fascist war only when the Russian Empire began to lose.
“Party agitators,” the CIA remarked,:
were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political activities, and to write about it to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevized soldiers wrote home encouraging their families to engage in the political struggle. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Thus, in the fight for Soviet power:
Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the regime during the uprising. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 16. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
In each soviet, there arose revolutionary guards, known as the Red Guards, on which the Bolsheviks had a large influence:
Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in the demonstration. Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers’ detachments in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan «All Power to the Soviet!» (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Given the overwhelming support which the Bolshevik Party enjoyed in the factory and soldiers’ committees:
The Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers’ committees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other cities. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 4. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Related: CIA-MI6: Bolsheviks enjoyed overwhelming popularity during October Revolution & Civil War
Fearing the rise of the communists, the regime began spreading the myth that Lenin was a German agent and claimed that Lenin was financed by the German intelligence. Yet, the regime’s claims contradict the intelligence report of its own ally, Britain. In this regard, the memorandum by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow, is instructive. Written to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, the memorandum by the top MI6 operative states:
I shall not enter here into the vexed controversy of the Bolshevik relations with the Imperial German Government. As far as the Bolshevik leaders are concerned and, in particular, Lenin, who is the brain and guiding force of the whole movement, I have never believed in such a combination, and the documentary evidence which has recently been published by the U.S.A. Government only strengthens [my] belief. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)
Lockhart continued:
it is obvious to-day first, that even if Lenin took money from the German Government, he used it for his own ends and not for German ends, and, secondly, that Bolshevism has now gone far beyond the stage of any outside control. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German nationalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)
Even Stephen Kotkin, a prominent historian and fellow of the neoconservative Hoover Institute think tank and of the Wilson Center, admitted:
Lenin … was not a German agent; he had his own agenda. (“Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928”, Stephen Kotkin, 2014, p. 188) (IMG)
Although the Russian regime succeeded in temporarily dissuading some workers to not join the communist movement, soon enough the anti-Lenin myth was no longer believed in. From then on, the Party grew even more. “Extension of Party control in army committees,” the US intelligence reported,:
proceeded exactly as in the factories by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust «compromisist» committees of higher units. As committees were won over, more Bolshevik delegates succeeded in being elected to soldiers’ sections of various soviets…. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Then came the historic moment: the Kornilov affair. Reactionary generals, in saving the ruling classes against the coming proletarian revolution, decided to stage a coup ostensibly against the bourgeois-democratic government of Kerensky, but actually against the Petrograd Soviet. On:
July 30, Kornilov had been appointed by Kerensky to replace Brusilov, Commander in Chief of Army. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)
Kornilov’s plan was to play good cop – bad cop with Kerensky. Kerensky, the ‘good cop’, would be overthrown by Kornilov, the ‘bad cop’, and the newly established Kornilov regime would be more suppressive against the communists and the Soviets, than the Kerensky administration was. Under the guise of overthrowing Kerensky’s government, Kornilov would actually direct his troops towards defeating the Bolsheviks and the Soviets, all the while covertly assisting Kerensky in pulling the strings in the new Kornilov junta to be set up. According to a document from US intelligence:
Kornilov was surrounded by political opportunists. He intended to get rid, by annihilation, of the Soviet, by military force. He tried to win the cooperation of the provisional government; but if, at the last moment, he found that he couldn’t get their cooperation, he intended to get rid of both the provisional government and the Soviet. This was further complicated when a direct split was made evidence on August 27, at a National Political Conference, attended by Kornilov. Kornilov was applauded by the conservative members. The socialist half of the delegation applauded Kerensky. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)
Kerensky would have a place in the new Kornilov government, as confirmed by a lecture in the CIA archives:
Kornilov received the impression that Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in Russia, while Kerensky would be satisfied with a place in government. Kornilov agreed. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
Many of the Constitutional Democrats supported Kornilov. Stephen Kinzer of the CIA’s anti-Soviet think tank, the ‘Hoover Institute’, admitted:
By summer 1917, many prominent classical liberal Constitutional Democrats would join forces on both the traditional right and the radical right in seeing a redeemer in General Lavr Kornilov, the Russian army’s supreme commander. (Stalin, Vol. 1, Stephen Kotkin, 2015, p. 184) (IMG)
The dialectical laws of history dictate that when two forces have converging interests, they would have a tendency to form an alliance. The alliance between Kornilov and Kerensky was natural, despite the outwardly appearances of fundamental differences: they were both anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevik. However, in order for an alliance to take place, there must be proper communication, something which was absent in this context. In those epoch-changing days, things were happening far too quickly and there was little time for coordination, little time for proper and thorough communication between Kerensky and Kornilov. Kornilov tried to present his proposal to Kerensky via an intermediary, Lvov. However, it is said that Lvov’s transfer of Kornilov’s message caused a misunderstanding, leading to the lack of coordination between Kerensky and Kornilov, and thus apparently leading to Kerensky to mistakenly distrust Kornilov:
Then Lvov presented to Kerensky the proposal as an ultimatum from Kornilov. On September 8, Kerensky called Kornilov for confirmation of the report that he had delegated Lvov to convey information of his plans and purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, neglecting to ask Kerensky what Lvov said to him. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
There were deeper reasons concerning the Kerensky-Kornilov rift. The Kerensky Administration, as a Kautskyite gang, sought to immerse itself among the proletarian mass bodies so to infiltrate them on behalf of finance capital and its allied comprador classes. In a way, the Kerensky group can be regarded as the Kornilov network’s fifth column within the labour movement. Yet, such a Kautskyite immersion amongst the proletarians also meant the encirclement of these Kautskyite agents with proletarian agents. The proletarian encirclement allowed the proletarian agents to successfully coopt the Kerensky gang, forcing the latter to partially engage in policies favourable to the proletariat, one of which inevitably was partial opposition to the Kornilov group. Thus, despite the Kerensky network’s alliance with the Kornilov network, the Kerensky network, thanks to cooptation by the proletariat’s agents, could not entirely mobilize in favour of the Kornilov group, a factor that ended up favouring the proletariat.
In such a situation,:
Kerensky, on September 9, dismissed Kornilov as Commander-In-Chief. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
However:
Kornilov, on September 10, issued a proclamation to all Russian citizens refusing to give up his post and asked for support against the Provisional Government. At the same time he ordered General Krymov to move the third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)
This condition of mutual distrust between two natural potential allies ultimately pushed Kerensky to form a pact with the Soviets and Bolsheviks as means of fighting back against the Kornilov coup:
Kerensky meanwhile joined forces with the left groups of the Petrograd Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare to fight General Krymov.
Propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the ranks of Krimov’s forces had an important effect, and Bolshevik railroad workers deflected a number of Krimov’s troop trains. When the two forces met, some distance outside of Petrograd, there was more fraternization than fighting. Kerensky ordered Krimov to report to Petrograd. Krimov did so…. Kornilov was arrested. In appreciation for the assistance given to him by the Petrograd Soviet, a number of the Bolshevik leaders … were released.
(INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)
As mentioned, the immersion of the Kerensky network, as Kautskyite agents of the reactionary classes, amongst the proletarians went both ways: on the one hand, it meant the intelligence penetration of the Kautskyite agents of fascism within the proletarian bodies, and, on the other hand, it led to the proletarian agents’ encirclement and cooptation of the Kautskyite agents in the ranks of the labour movement. The fact that the Kerensky Administration, as a pro-fascist Kautskyite anti-socialist cabinet, was compelled to ally with the proletarian mass bodies and with the Bolshevik Party against the Kautskyites’ covert ally, the Kornilov group, demonstrates the level of cooptation enforced by the proletariat’s agents within the Kerensky movement. It shows that the armament of the Soviet was the result of a pro-Soviet tendency pervading throughout the Kerensky regime, a proletarian current that coopted the Kerensky gang and not only forced the latter to partially democratize the system in favour of the empowerment of the Bolshevik Party but also proactively supported, or compromised the reactionary attempts to block, the armament of such proletarian mass bodies as the Soviets. Thus, even if the Kerensky group’s measure against its own covert ally, the Kornilov group, was an ‘accident’ or strategic ‘mistake’ committed by Kerensky, the ‘mistake’ still had the deliberate non-accidental support of and enforcement by the proletarian agents within the regime. The Kautskyites, as fascist agents within the labour movement, can help in the fascist overthrow of socialism, but so too can they, as fascist agents surrounded and thus coopted by proletarians, end up as the unwilling captives used by socialism in the struggle to obliterate fascism.
Hence:
The [Kerensky] Government issued arms to the workers during the Kornilov danger. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
And the Red Guard force:
was legalized by the Kornilov affair…. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
To resist Kornilov, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) was created:
On 9 September, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet created a «Committee of Struggle against Counterrevolution» to resist Kornilov. The Bolsheviks entered this committee, which was also known as the «Military Revolutionary Committee,” as a dominant minority. The district soviets passed resolutions in favor of sending representatives to the committee, establishing control over the commissars of the Government, and of organizing mobile fighting squads to arrest Kornilov’s agitators. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 7. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The Red Guards were increasingly under the control of the Bolsheviks, as it was the latter which each of the Soviets elected:
When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bolsheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the stores of Bolshevized garrison units. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The Bolsheviks would have already gained access to tremendous amounts of arms even without the Kornilov coup; this was because the Bolsheviks had successfully recruited numerous soldiers, who could not only become excellent fighters for the communist revolution but also had direct physical access to arms caches. The failure of the Kornilov coup did however bolster the Bolshevik-influenced armed forces.
Forget not that a liberal democratic state can directly militarily arm the very forces that shall, briefly after such armament, overthrow it. The Kerensky government’s military armament of its Bolshevik and Soviet overthrowers, though as an immediate cause being upon the occasion of the Kornilov coup, bore a deep-rooted longer-term cause. A pro-fascist bourgeois-democracy, a state of an uneasy and fragile «compromise» between the proletariat and the anti-proletarian classes, had been imposed by the proletariat over the Russian regime, thus bringing forth the Kerensky government. Democratization, however, was a mere excuse by which the proletariat semi-unconsciously increased its power. That same proletarian class, ever seeking more power, lobbied to overthrow that liberal democratic order and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat, a state very democratic in favour of the proletariat but not so democratic when facing the proletariat’s class foes. When the reactionary classes grow fragile in liberal democracies, the latter, under the increased influence of the proletarian lobby, can go so far as to literally and directly militarily fund the very proletariat that shall violently overthrow the liberal democratic state. This is an important historical fact to remember when examining the methods by which to exploit the irony of liberal democracy.
Related: The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly
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