Yugoslav regime closed Greek rebels’ training camps, confiscated their weapons, and sent the rebels to Greece without weapons so that they would be mass-slaughtered by the monarcho-fascists.
The Communist Party of Greece led the Anti-Fascist Resistance during WWII.
The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies. Chapter 15, Section 6 (C15S6).
Saed Teymuri
In building an alliance of working class and bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist parties, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), pursued the popular frontism strategy and replaced communist slogans with patriotic and progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist slogans, thereby boosting the Party’s image in public and challenging the Axis occupation. The archives of the OSS and CIA confirm this. The US intelligence reported:
[T]he people … soon formed underground resistance groups. The leftist EAM (National Liberation Front), with its own army ELAS (National Popular Army of Liberation), became the largest of these groups…. (…). EAM was dominated by KKE (Greek Communist Party). By stressing patriotic motives and with the advantage of a well-integration organization, the Communists succeeded at first in enlisting the support of many liberals and republicans and even some of the clergy and royalists who saw in EAM the best means of resisting the common enemy. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
An attached memorandum prepared by Lieutenant Edmon of the Greek Desk in Cairo supports the belief that the most numerous and effective resistance organization in Greece is the EAM with its guerrilla force known as the ELAS (National People’s Liberation Army). According to the Union of Democratic Control, a London organization informing the British public on resistance movements in forming the British public on resistance movements in occupied Europe, the EAM emerged following the German occupation of Greece in 1941. The nucleus appears to have been the Liberal, Socialist, Communist and Agrarian groups who led the opposition to the Metaxas regime. In any event, it is known to embrace today the only groups of organized labor in Greece, including the transport, dock, industrial, building and service trades, white collar, government and commercial workers. With these and other forces, EAM has directed a series of strikes aimed against the Greek quisling government and has also struck at German communications by destroying bridges, tunnels, etc. (Report on Labor Desk Activities in Middle East Theater Relative to Greece, Secret, OSS, 1944, p. 2. In: ‘OSS – GREEK MISSION, GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1944’, OSS, 1944. In: CIA Archives.) (IMG)
Nonetheless,:
Differences between the Government-in-Exile and the underground forces of resistance grew steadily. In the summer of 1943, representatives of EAM and other resistance groups, including EDES, visited Cairo, where the government was then established, in an unsuccessful effort to secure representation in the government for the underground forces…. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
However, this was met with the:
persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government…. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
Among the Greek militant organizations, “all except EDES and a few minor groups,” said US intelligence,:
had in common their dislike of the Tsouderos government and the King. Most Greeks had not forgotten the King’s violation of the constitution in condoning a dictatorship. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
The widespread Greek mass hatred towards the exiled king also led the resistsance movement to seek:
to obtain from the King a promise not to return to Greece until the people had had an opportunity to express their wishes on the matter by plebiscite. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
Naturally, the British-backed Greek royalist government-in-exile, refused. Thus,:
Shortly thereafter, EAM formed in Greece a Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) to counteract and dispute the authority of the Government-in-Exile. The persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government had led to general dissatisfaction, and eventually even to serious mutinies in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. Finally the British, who had consistently supported the King and the government, assisted in the suppression of the mutinies and installed as Prime Minister the anti-EAM George Papandreou. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
Nonetheless, in the words of Allison B. Herrick who had years of experience working in USAID and authored the Area Handbook for Greece in the American University’s Foreign Areas Studies Division,:
Papandreou met in Lebanon with delegates of EAM, and later in Caserta they signed an agreement which recognized the authority of the new Government and placed all Greek forces under British control. The Caserta Agreement allowed the British to land troops in Athens and take control of all ELAS forces insofar as military operations against the retreating German Army were concerned. (Area Handbook for Greece, American University (Washington D.C.), Foreign Areas Studies Division, Vol. 550, Issue 87, Allison Butler Herrick, p. 41. Bold added.) (IMG)
Hence:
Papandreou set out to form a coalition as agreed upon in May 1944 in Lebanon, where representatives of all resistance groups from inside Greece had met with the Government-in-exile. Three members of the PEEA and two Communists joined the Cabinet. In September, the new government moved from Cairo to Caserta, Italy, and there in a formal agreement received assurances of collaboration from EAM and EDES, who placed themselves under the orders of the Commander of the British forces in Greece. The government entered Athens on 19 October 1944. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
Furthermore, as confirmed by a case study of guerrilla warfare in Greece, created under contract by the US Department of the Army:
EAM/ELAS honored the Caserta provisions in the main during the German withdrawal. No guerrillas entered the Athens area; there was no attempt to seize power. (Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, American University (Washington D.C.), Special Warfare Research Division, Operating under contract with Department of the Army, Doris M. Condit, 1961, p. 89) (IMG)
The British, however, betrayed the agreement by ordering ELAS to give up arms. In response:
ELAS disregarded Scobie’s order to lay down its arms, reminding him that his authority extended only to operations against the Germans. The EAM ministers resigned from the government and held a demonstration in Athens on December 3, 1944, to protest the British demand. The police fired into the crowd to disperse it, and that action set off a chain reaction of violence between government troops and ELAS.
The Battle of Athens – the second round in the civil war – lasted one month. The British, who intervened against ELAS, were compelled to withdraw two divisions from the Italian front to reinforce their hard-pressed forces in the Greek capital. The renewed fighting also had the unpleasant aspect of pitting Greek government forces, which now included some who a short time before had been active collaborationists, against men who had taken leading parts in the resistance. The United States Mission in Athens had been instructed to remain neutral….
(Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)
The fact that the British and their allied comprador Greek regime utilized Axis fighters to combat the communist-led popular front once again exposes the covert WWII-era Anglo-Axis alliance against the USSR and Popular-Democratic forces. The British moved ahead with their agenda of disarming the Greek fighters:
Churchill temporarily defused the controversial question of the monarchy by persuading George II to appoint as regent the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, a heroic figure during the occupation who was respected by both sides. Papandreou resigned as prime minister, and the regent appointed a republican to succeed him. The change in government paved the way for a cease-fire. Thirty-three days of street fighting cost 11,000 lives and left sections of Athens in ruins. Under the provisions of the armistice ELAS laid down its arms, the KKE and the EAM agreed to reorganize as legal political parties, and parliamentary elections and a plebiscite on the king’s future were scheduled to be held within the year. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)
The damage inflicted by the MI6-backed forces against the KKE-led fighters rolled back the communist faction in the KKE and strengthened the capitulationist Titoist tendency led by Markos Vafeiadis. This increased the MI6 lobby in the KKE, allowing for a laydown of the arms by segments of the ELAS. However, the KKE/EAM/ELAS continued to retain large parts of their arms in secret, or else there was no way that they would be able to launch the rebellion later on.
Signed in “In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12th February, 1945,” it was a deal between the “The Delegation of the Central Committee of EAM” and the “The Delegation of the Hellenic Government” and was known as the Varkiza Agreement. “ Article IX” of the Agreement, titled “Plebiscite and elections,” explicitly stated that the plebiscite was to be held prior to the elections, partly so that the Greek electorate would be assured that the King would no longer be able to violate the constitution and condone a dictatorship, as he had done before. It was as follows:
At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers. (868.00/3–645, Agreement Between the Greek Government and EAM, [Translation], Athens, February 12, 1945. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, United States Department of State, p. 113) (IMG)
However, in a blatant violation of the Agreement,:
In November 1945 a caretaker government, composed of a broad coalition that excluded the Communists, announced parliamentary elections for the following March. When a communist request for postponement of the election until after the plebiscite was denied, the KKE pulled out its candidates and asked supporters to abstain from voting. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)
The Anglo-American-backed fascist regime in Greece created an atmosphere of fear among Greek voters. The unfree, unfair, and illegal elections held under the shadow of a Nazi-collaborationist state gave the pro-fascist candidates a ‘plurality’ of the votes:
An Allied commission monitored the elections, which were marked by a swing to the right…. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, pp. 30-31) (IMG)
Then ocurred the illegal and phony ‘plebiscite’ which happened post-elections, against the Varkiza Agreement:
The plebiscite, held in September, returned a 69-percent majority in favor of George II’s returning to Greece as king. He died the next spring and was succeeded by his brother, Paul.
During 1946 a series of isolated uprisings by leftists in various parts of the country escalated into a third round in the civil war. The KKE organized the so-called Democratic Army of Greece as ELAS’ successor, and it conducted a classic guerrilla war against a static defense by conventional forces. The main guerrilla activity was in the Peloponnesus and in Macedonia and Epirus close to the sanctuary of the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian borders, across which the communist forces could retreat to rest and regroup before returning to combat. Across these borders also ran the lines of supply for the Greek Communists.
The government imposed martial law, permitting arrests without warrants. In 1947 it outlawed the KKE….
(Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)
As is well-known, General Markos was considered a Tito agent. Like most imperialist-fascist secret service agents in the freedom movements, Markos promoted the view that there was no need for strategic coordination with the friend of the Greek communist-led rebels, the USSR, that the Greek communists should jump straight to rebellion without such coordination:
according to the Yugoslavs, the second Greek insurrection of 1947 was undertaken by agreement between Markos and Tito without previous policy coordination in Moscow. (THE ZHDANOV-MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 29, 1953, p. 14) (IMG)
Early on in the War, in addition to the Tito agent Markos, defeatist renegades such as Siantos and his group were up against the Zachariadis faction:
1. Georgios Siantos and other leaders who signed the Lebanon Agreement for the Greek Left-wing, are now fighting against Nikolaos Zachariades and Ioannis Ioannides in an effort to cause the abandonment of their “policy of illegality” and to bring about a surrender of arms in exchange for a policy of forming a legal party.
2. (…). Zachariades, however, still argues that a surrender of arms would mean being murdered at the hands of the extreme Right. To support his stand, he cites the murders at Gythion and Sgala, the killing of the Salonika news-printers….
(SCHISM IN GREEK LEFTIST FORCES, CIA, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)
The Anglo-American imperialists provided assistance of all kinds to the fascist regime in Greece:
By 1947 the British had reluctantly admitted their inability to continue substantial aid to the Greek government. In March of that year, by covering Greece in the Truman Doctrine – which set limits on American tolerance to communist expansion in the area – the United States replaced Great Britain as Greece’s protecting power. American military and economic aid was crucial during the final phase of the civil war and would remain vital to Greece’s subsequent recovery, reconstruction, and development. A joint American-Greek general staff in Athens directed the war effort against the Communists, and American military advisers assisted Greek government units in the field. American political and economic advisers also worked closely with Greek officials in planning and supervising programs financed by American aid. (…). Total United States military and economic aid from 1946 to 1975 amounted to US$4.3 billion, more than 60 percent of it in military assistance and more than 90 percent in direct grants. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)
The Anglo-American imperialists and comprador Yugoslav sources have perpetuated the myth that the USSR refused to provide assistance to the communist-led Greek democratic rebels. Once again, the imperialist and comprador media have been spreading lies. Of course, it cannot be expected that a country far more devastated than the Anglo-Americans as a result of the Great Patriotic War, would be capable of ‘showering’ the Greek rebels with weapons and training. Nonetheless, to the extent of its abilities, the USSR provided military and diplomatic assistance to the Greek rebels covertly through the Peoples’ Democracies. For start, the Soviets really desired the triumph of the Greek revolution:
In the hope of bringing about a Greek government less unsympathetic to the USSR, the Soviets will seek to weaken and discredit the present rightist royalist government by promoting insurgent activities in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)
After all:
The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)
Thus, the Soviets were expected to actively encourage the Peoples’ Democracies to support the rebels:
The Soviets … will concentrate on intensifying the present dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece. To accomplish the purpose, they will provide clandestine aid to Greek leftists through their satellites…. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)
Nor were Kremlin leaders by any means afraid to support the Greek Guerillas:
There is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of the strong US interest in Greece and current US assistance to the Greeks in the form of money, material, and advisors, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had wanted…. It also seems unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred from supporting the guerrillas by any fear of UN action to seal Greece’s northern borders. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)
“The insurgents have a variety of arms,” said one CIA document, adding that among these arms held by Greek rebels:
Soviet arms … have also been reported. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)
According to the 1947 CIA report, the “Soviets will … continue to” provide “clandestine aid to Greek” rebels:
The Soviets will … continue to work through their satellites (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) to intensify the dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece by providing clandestine aid to Greek leftists, disseminating propaganda against the Rightist Greek government, opposing the retention of British troops in Greece, and maintaining troops along the northern borders as a psychological threat. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
And precisely as expected by the American intelligence, the USSR indeed covertly sponsored the rebels through Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania:
Under Soviet direction, Greece’s northern neighbors – Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania – are conducting a drive which presumably has for its ultimate objective the establishment of a Communist Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)
William Donovan – the founder of the America’s centralized intelligence service, an agent of the MI6, and a mentor of CIA Director Allen Dulles – confirmed that the Soviets were behind the campaign of supporting the communist and progressive guerrillas in Greece:
Since the formal ending of World War II, under the threat of the Red Army, the Soviet Union by use of penetration, domination of political groups, economic pressures, has in 5 years without firing a shot, set up between itself and the West, a bulwark of satellite South Eastern States which can be of great military and economic importance.
The Soviets sought to bring Greece within that group through proxy military invasion. Under the guise of civil war-organized guerrilla forces under Soviet trained leaders were placed in the mountains with light detachments sent out to burn, to pillage and to terrorize.
In Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, schools, hospitals, and supply dumps were established for replacements, indoctrination and training. In each of the countries, but especially Albania, were places of refuge for the Communist guerrillas when hard pressed.
(‘LECTURE BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN ON PARTISAN WARFARE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, TEXAS’, CIA, William Donovan, January 11, 1951) (IMG)
An American imperialist secret service document cited a CIA informant connected to Tito’s secret service regarding information that the Soviet airfields in Yugoslavia were to provide supplies to communist-led Greek rebel forces:
The informant learned form a member of the Yugoslav Secret Information Service that the Yugoslav General Staff is continuing to furnish meteorological data to Soviet airfields (locations unknown) whose planes supply Markos troops. It is alleged that four air transports are sent to Rebel territory nightly from these fields. (GREEK REBEL CONTACTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)
The USSR shipped weapons to the revolutionary guerrillas in Greece in part through ‘Split’, a city located in Yugoslavia, now in modern-day Croatia. By the middle of 1948, however, the CIA agent Tito (see C12S1) and his group, who secretly sided with the Greek monarcho-fascist regime, successfully expanded their influence in Yugoslavia at the expense of the Soviet-backed elements. Thus, even prior to the expulsion of Tito’s gang from the Cominform, the former stabbed the Greek rebels and the USSR in the back. Indeed:
Shortly prior to the Cominform rift considerable war materiel, sent by the Soviets from Odessa to Split for transshipment to the Greek rebels, was seized by the Yugoslav Army. This included 70 tanks since distributed among the Yugoslav forces. Subsequent attempts by Rebel delegates to negotiate with Marshal Tito for a return of these arms have proved to be in vain. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)
After the expulsion, Tito’s betrayal of the communist-led Greek rebels intensified:
The following measures were taken by the Yugoslavs against the Greek Rebels in the recent past:
a.Two camps in Bosnia (location unspecified), long used for basic training and as a rest centers by the Rebels have been closed.
b.All foreign volunteers training in Yugoslavia for eventual incorporation into the Rebel forces have been sent to Greece, but their weapons and supplies were confiscated. Even those not desiring to go to [Greece] have been forced across the frontier.
c.Wounded Rebel soldiers recuperating in Yugoslavia and Rebels inadvertently crossing into Yugoslav territory have not been permitted to return to their respective units.
d.Two Rebel radio stations in Yugoslavia have been closed.
(Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1. Underline original.) (IMG)
Some Yugoslav anti-fascists and/or communists, whom the Yugoslav regime called ‘Cominformists’, dared to disobey the commands of the Titoist mafia:
Despite an order issued by the Yugoslav Government in February 1949 to all nationals fighting with Greek partisans to return immediately to Yugoslavia, approximately 450 Yugoslavs, mostly Cominformists, are still with the Rebel forces. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)
So significant was the CIA agent Tito’s assistance to the Greek monarcho-fascists that the US intelligence stated:
The three main factors in the survival of an independent [read: pro-Western] Greece have been US-UK military aid, the Greek military effort, and Tito’s defection from the Cominform. (Current Situation in Greece, CIA, February 28, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)
Tito’s betrayals failed to stop the USSR from continuing its assistance to Greek rebels. Well into 1948, the CIA expected the Soviet Union ‘to continue to supply … the guerrillas’, clearly implying that the USSR was already supplying the guerrillas:
Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece under Communist domination still obtains. For the following reasons the Kremlin may be expected to continue to supply Continuing and use the guerrillas…. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 2-3. Bold added.) (IMG)
The CIA, citing the Turkish diplomatic intelligence in Greece, stated that:
on 27 September 1948 Russian airplanes made drops of all kinds of war materiel to the guerrillas in various parts of Macedonia and Epiros. (‘Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas’, CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)
The Turkish Consulate, as cited by the CIA reported that:
The guerrillas of the Papades region are being supported quite openly by the Bulgarian military authorities on the Greek-Bulgarian border. (‘Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos’, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas, CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)
In addition:
The Turkish Consulate in Salonika [Greece] has reported to the Embassy in Athens that General Markos Vafiades … is receiving war materiel of Soviet origin and will make new attacks on Western Macedonia. (‘Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas’, CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)
Hungary and Romania also provided military assistance to the Greek rebels:
The Greek Guerrilla training center formerly located in Siklos, Hungary has been moved to Pecs. (…). An unconfirmed report places the existence of an international brigade of 25,000 men near Szeged. A recruit training camp has been established in Rumania where 4,200 Greek Guerrillas are reported. (Troop Movement in the Balkans, CIA, July 11, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)
Following the large-scale purge of many Titoist elements in Albania, People’s Democratic Albania was able to more closely align with the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. Albania’s government was strengthened and, according to the CIA, became ‘a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas’:
Despite Soviet attempts to strengthen Albania following the defection of Tito and the increasingly important role assigned to Albania in supplying the Greek guerrillas and resisting Tito, isolated Albania will probably one of the weakest of the Soviet Satellites. Gradual build-up of Albania into a full-fledged Satellite began in late 1948 with a purge of the nationalistic elements in Albanian government. Then, as a Kremlin favorite free from Yugoslav influence, Albania signed trade agreements with Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. More recently, a number of actions underlined the Kremlin’s determination to strengthen Albania. An unusually ostentatious reception was given the Albanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign a trade agreement, and Albania was belatedly brought into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. However, it is still difficult to determine if these Soviet actions have accomplished anything more than to enable Albania to continue resisting increasing pressure from Tito and to serve as a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas. (WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 47, CIA, April 22, 1949, pp. 7-8) (IMG)
The Greek regime posed a menace to the whole camp of the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. The monarcho-fascist leaders of Greece had territorial ambitions which the Soviet Union and its Popular Democratic allies sought to, and successfully did, block:
The Soviets [are] determined to prevent the expansion of Greece through territorial revisions at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. So far they have been successful, since the Council of Foreign Ministers has not recognized Greek claims for boundary changes. (…). Accomplishment of this end would constitute an important step towards the ultimate goal. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)
“The Soviets,” the CIA continued, “will”:
continue to oppose the retention of British troops in Greece, and exert psychological pressure by retaining troops along the northern borders. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)
The CIA also expected that the Soviets would:
disseminate propaganda to discredit the government…. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)
Indeed, diplomatically, too, the Soviet Union pressured for the expulsion of Britain from Greece:
The USSR member, Andrei Gromyko, repeated these counter-charges and added that one main cause of all the troubles was the presence of foreign (i.e. British) troops in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)
The Soviets in fact constantly complained about the British occupation:
The Soviets are constantly protesting against the presence of the British occupation forces in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 14) (IMG)
And they took firm diplomatic action in support of the revolution:
The USSR has been able to block any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that … no UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)
Click here to see the Screenshots of the Photos and Sources used.
Cover image source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/shadowboxing-over-greek-civil-war/ . The link in turn cites Wikimedia.
Fuentes:
https://sovinform.net/greece.htm